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INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal of an Qrck

. Dismissal w itli Pi eji idice piii suant tc • R i l k 12(b)(6)
Pendant University of Utah filed a motion to dismiss

Plaintiff and Appellant, James Webb's ("Webb"), claims against it for Webb's failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court granted the University of Utah's
motion. Subsequently, the trial com i i muni an unin nil IIIMMIV ilnl iIn irnuimm'pirliri
based on tl le j oint stipi llation of the remaining parties.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court

* -

'Sjuiisiliclion in Ihis niafln imisimnl I 11 All ('ODb ANN.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR R E V I E W
Does a IINIMMIII1 \\\ \ i ill

m i

sliicluih ilm fxcnisc reasonable care when

providing educational instruction to its students?
The trial court's Order of Dismissal may be affirmed only if it appears to a certainty
that Webb would not be entitled to relief undei aiijv M/I <>l l<ul . ulin;h \ uuld hi phhi i n
s ..

•

r - ^s v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991). The issue is reviewed

for correctness, granting no deference to the trial court's ruling. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v.
St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194,195 (Utah 1991). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the

1

Court shall "accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Prows v.
State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991).
Plaintiff preserved this issue in the trial court in his opposition brief and during the
oral argument hearing on this matter. See Records Index 35-38 (Memorandum in Opposition
to University of Utah's Motion to Dismiss) and 164-167 (Copy of Transcript of Motion to
Dismiss Hearing Held 1/24/00), for preservation of this issue in the trial court.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Addendum, Exhibit D.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1998, Webb attended a class field trip as a student of the Defendant and Appellee,
University of Utah. During the field trip, the University of Utah instructed Webb to travel
upon icy and snow covered ground. Webb was injured when he slipped and fell on the ice
and snow covering the ground upon which the University of Utah instructed Webb to walk.
Webb filed a lawsuit against the University of Utah, alleging that the University of Utah was
negligent in directing Webb, its student, to participate in a dangerous class activity.
The University of Utah filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure arguing that it owed no duty of care to its students. On
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January 31,2000, the trial court entered the Order granting the University of Utah's Motion
to Dismiss. On November 13, 2002, the trial court entered an Order dismissing the
remaining defendant named in the lawsuit.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

Webb was a student of the University of Utah. See Complaint, ^f 6; Records
Index 2.

2.

Webb was injured while participating in a university-mandated and supervised
class activity. See Complaint,ffl[7, and 9; Records Index 2.

3.

Webb alleged that the University of Utah was negligent for instructing him to
travel into a dangerous area. See Complaint, ^f 12; Records Index 2.

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The University of Utah owes a duty to its students under fundamental principles of
tort law to exercise reasonable care in performing services on behalf of its students.
"Contractual relationships for the performance of services impose on each of the contracting
parties a general duty of due care toward the other." DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d
433,435 (Utah 1983).
It is clearly established that one who undertakes to act. . . thereby becomes
obligated to act with reasonable care. . . . There is no reason why a
university may act without regard to the consequences of its actions while
every other legal entity is charged with acting as a reasonably prudent
person would in like or similar circumstances.
Nova Southeastern Univ., Inc. v. Gross, 758 So.2d 86, 89-90 (Fla. 2000) (emphasis added).
Webb contracted with the University of Utah for the performance of a service - to
obtain educational instruction. Under fundamental principles of tort law, the University
owed a duty to Webb to act as a reasonably prudent person when it undertook the act of
providing educational instruction to Webb.
Webb satisfied Utah's liberal notice pleading requirement to state a claim for which
relief can be granted by alleging in his complaint that the University of Utah was negligent
for instructing him to participate in a dangerous activity.

4

ARGUMENT
The University of Utah argued, and the trial court agreed, that, as a matter of law, the
University of Utah owes no duty to exercise reasonable care while providing educational
instruction to its students. However, the University of Utah owed a duty to Webb to exercise
reasonable care while providing educational instruction to Webb under fundamental
principles of tort law.
"To establish negligence, a plaintiff must first establish a duty of care owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff.... The issue of whether a duty exists is entirely a question of law
to be determined by the court." Ferree v. Utah, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989).
The Utah Supreme Court has long held that the existence of a contractual relationship
for the performance of services imposes on each of the contracting parties a general duty of
due care toward the other. See DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433,435 (Utah 1983).
The Supreme Court recognized that "a party who breaches his duty of due care toward
another may be found liable to the other in tort, even where the relationship giving rise to
such a duty originates in a contract between parties." Id. (citing Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (holding that "a wrongful act committed in the course of a
contractual relationship may afford both tort and contractual relief.")).
The Supreme Court explained that "a majority of jurisdictions, like Utah, have
recognized a duty to exercise reasonable care on the part of one who undertakes to render
services." Id. at 436. To support its position, the Supreme Court noted that the Restatement
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(Second) of Torts and Prosser are in accord. Id. The Supreme Court quoted the following
passage set forth by Prosser:
It is no longer in dispute that one who renders services to another is under a
duty to exercise reasonable care in doing so, and that he is liable for any
negligence to anyone who may foreseeably be expected to be injured as a
result.
I d (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 104 (4th ed. 1971)).

Therefore, under Utah law, the University of Utah owed a duty to exercise reasonable
care to Webb when rendering services to Webb.
Unlike cases where a university was found not to owe a duty to students who are
injured while participating in after-class activities and who based their claims against a
university for failing to babysit them after class,1 many cases exist which establish that a

]

The Utah Supreme Court has held that college administrators no longer "assume[]

a role in loco parentis." Beach v. University of Utah. 726 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah 1986)
(holding that university did not have duty to supervise student after class was over).
Thus, an educational institution is not required to "babysit each student" when the student
is not in class. Id. However, this case presents a factual situation entirely distinct from
Beach because Webb's injuries are alleged to be directly caused from the negligent
instruction he received while in class as opposed to the injuries which were caused by the
self-created dangers and events which occurred after class in Beach.
6

university owes a duty to students who are injured while participating in class activities and
receiving contracted-for educational instruction.
For example, in Delbridge v. Maricopa County Community College Dist. 893 P.2d
55 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995), a student at a community college was injured while, at his
instructor's direction, climbing a utility pole during a class exercise without a safety strap.
The court in Delbridge noted that
[s]chool districts, administrators, and teachers have a legal obligation for the
benefit of the students enrolled in their classes. This obligation includes a
duty not to subject those students, through acts, omissions, or school policy,
to a foreseeable and unreasonable harm.
Id at 58 (emphasis added).
The community college argued that it did not owe a duty to its students, citing in
support of its position Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986). The court,
however, distinguished Beach from the case it was reviewing. It noted that
the issue here, however, concerns a school district's duty to provide safe inclass environment for its students
Even if we accept the fact that the class
was held off-campus, [the student] was injured nonetheless while performing
an exercise which was both supervised by the instructor and included in the
curriculum. Therefore, the custodial supervision and in loco parentis cases
cited by [the community college] do not govern this appeal.
By contrast, courts in a number of other jurisdictions have imposed liability on
colleges and universities for injuries suffered by students while attending
classes. E.g. Brigham Young University v. Lillywhite, 118 F.2d 836 (10th Cir.
1941) (university liable to student injured in chemistry lab); LaVoie v. New
York. 91 A.D.2d 749,458 N.Y.S.2d 277 (1982) (same); DeMaurov.Tsuculum
College. Inc.. 603 S.W.2d 115 (Tenn. 1980) (university liable to student
injured in physical education class); Amon v. New York. 68 A.D.2d 941,414
N.Y.S.2d 68 (1979) (university liable to student cut by a table saw in the
7

university scenery shop); Grover v. San Mateo Junior College Dist. 146
Cal.App.2d 86, 303 P.2d 602 (1956) (college liable to student injured during
noncompulsory part of aeronautics course); Yarborough v. City University of
New York. 137 Misc. 2d 282, 520 N.Y.S.2d 518 (Ct. CL 1987) (university
liable to student injured in physical education class).
Delbridge v. Maricopa County Community College Dist, 893 P.2d 55, 59 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1995) (some emphasis in original and some added).2
The Florida Supreme Court is in accord with those jurisdictions that have held that a
state-owned university owes a duty to its students to exercise reasonable care in providing

2

Like the Arizona Court, Webb also found many other decisions in other

jurisdictions in which courts held that a university owes a duty to a student who
participates in school activities. E.g. Hores v. Sargent, 230 A.2d 712 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996) (holding that university owed duty to take reasonable precautions for safety of
students participating in school-organized bicycle trip); Kyriazis v. University of West
Virginia, 450 S.E.2d 649 (holding that "University owes a duty of due care to its students
when it encourages them to participate in any sport.'5); Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg
College. 989 F.2d 1360 (3rd Cir. 1993) (holding that university owes duty of care to
student injured while participating in athletic event); Whittington v. Sowela Technical
Inst., 438 So.2d 236 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that school owes duty to student injured
while on nursing school field trip); and Kirchner v. Yale Univ.. 192 A.2d 641 (Conn.
1963) (holding that university was obligated to exercise reasonable care to instruct and
warn shop students in safe and proper operation of machines).
8

educational instruction to its students. The Florida Supreme Court recently rejected a
university's argument that it did not owe a duty to its students merely because it does not
stand in loco parentis with its students. See Nova Southeastern Univ.. Inc. v. Gross, 758
So.2d 86,89 (Fla. 2000). The Court explained that just because a school does not owe a duty
to assume a custodial role with a student does not mean that fundamental principles of tort
law do not apply to the school. See id. The court noted that
it is clearly established that one who undertakes to act, even when under no
obligation to do so, thereby becomes obligated to act with reasonable care. .
. . There is no reason why a university may act without regard to the
consequences of its actions while every other legal entity is charged with
acting as a reasonably prudent person would in like or similar
circumstances.
Id at 89-90 (emphasis added).
In Nova, a case similar to this one, a student brought a claim against a university under
a common law negligence theory based upon the university's assigning her to participate in
a mandatory practicum at a dangerous location. The trial court dismissed the case because
it determined that the university did not owe a duty to its student. The student appealed the
decision to the Florida Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals distinguished cases that have held that schools do not "have a
duty of supervision when the injuries have occurred off campus while students have been
involved in non-school related activities." Gross v. Family Serv. Agency, Inc.. 716 So.2d
337, 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis in original). The court noted that in the case
it was asked to review, the student was involved in a university-mandated activity at a
9

location specifically approved and suggested by the university. The court held that the
university had a duty "to use ordinary care in providing educational services and programs
to one of its adult students." Id
In reviewing the appellate court decision, the Florida Supreme Court agreed with the
appellate court's analysis and held that a university owes a "duty to use reasonable care in
assigning students to practicum locations." Nova Southeastern Univ., Inc. v. Gross, 758
So.2d 86, 90 (Fla. 2000).
Like the numerous colleges and universities referred to in the cases cited above, the
University of Utah owed Webb a duty to act as a reasonably prudent person when it
undertook the act of providing educational instruction to him. Webb alleged in his complaint
that the University of Utah was negligent in assigning him to participate in a dangerous,
university-mandated activity. Thus, Webb satisfied his obligation under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the
University of Utah owed him a duty to exercise reasonable care while providing educational
instruction to him.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Webb respectfully requests that the trial court's Order
of Dismissal be reversed and that this case be remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.

10

Dated this J^_ day of / l l w , 2003.
DRIGGS, BILLS & DAY, P.C.

;£-

Brent Gordon
Attorney for Appellant and Plaintiff
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Addendum "A"

Kenneth A. Bills (#6835)
DRIGGS, OSBORNE & HUANG
Attorneys for Plaintiff
331 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 363-9982
Fax:(801)363-8370
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAMES WEBB,
Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT

v.
The UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, a division
of the State of Utah, PARK PLAZA
CONDOMINIUM OWNER'S
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Non-Profit
Corporation, and JONETTE WEBSTER.

Case Number: ^ O W f c # 9

Judge:

MgyiflenriixD

Defendants.

Plaintiff, James Webb, by and through his undersigned counsel of record, complains and
alleges against above named defendants as follows:
1.

Plaintiff James Webb is an individual and resident of Salt Lake County, State of

2.

Defendant University of Utah is a governmental entity of the State of Utah.

3.

Defendant Jonette Webster is an individual and resident of Salt Lake County,

Utah.

State of Utah.
4.

Defendant Park Plaza Condominium Owner's Association is a non-profit

corporation operating in the State of Utah.

5.

Plaintiffs have complied with all procedural provisions of the Utah's

Governmental Immunity Act.
6.

On or about March 7,1998, Plaintiff was a student in a class held by Defendant

University of Utah.
7.

As part of the class, Defendant University of Utah had a scheduled "field trip" for

the class that Plaintiff was enrolled in.
8.

Thefieldtrip was, in part, to examine various fault lines in the Salt Lake County

9.

As part of thefieldtrip, the students were taken to property owned and under the

area.

control of Defendant Park Plaza Condominiums.
10.

The sidewalks under the control of Defendant Park Plaza Condominiums were

covered with snow and ice.
11.

While standing on the sidewalk, Defendant Jonette Webster slipped on the ice,

and while attempting to steady herself, caused Plaintiff to slip and fall on the concrete.
12.

Defendant University of Utah was negligent included, without limitation, failing

to obtain permission of landowners before taking a class on a scheduledfieldtrip, and taking the
class into a dangerous area.
13.

Defendant Park Plaza Condominiums was negligent in failing to maintain a

reasonable and safe condition on walkways under its control.
14.

Defendant Jonette Webster was negligent in failing to maintain her footing and

falling, and in grabbing the Plaintiff as she slipped, causing Plaintiff to fall.
15.

As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants' negligence, the Plaintiff has

sustained serious injuries to his body and shock and injuries to his system. All of said injuries

have caused and continue to cause the Plaintiff great physical suffering and mental pain and
suffering. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereupon alleges, that said injuries and
said pain and suffering will be permanent and will result in permanent disability to the Plaintiff.
16.

As a further and proximate result of the aforesaid negligence of the Defendants,

Plaintiff has been forced to incur medical bills for medical and hospital attention in an amount
subject to proof at trial.
17.

Plaintiff has suffered special damages in a sum subject to proof at trial.

18.

Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the amount incurred on special damages pursuant

to the applicable statutes of the State of Utah.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff pray for judgment against the defendants as follows:
1.

For a determination by the Court that the defendants were responsible for the

various injuries suffered by the Plaintiff.
2.

For a judgment against the defendants for special damages in a sum subject to

proof at trial, as well as interest thereon.
3.

For general damages against the defendants in a sum subject to proof at trail.

4.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

DATED this ^ ? d a y of August, 1999
BY: DRIGGS, OSBORNE & HUANG

Kenneth A. Bills
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Plaintiffs Address:
1230 Roosevelt Ave
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105

Addendum "B"

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JAMES WEBB,

Case No. 990909689 PI
Supreme Court No. 20000181-SC

Plaintiff;
v
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, et al.,
Defendants,

MOTION TO DISMISS HEARING HELD JANUARY 24, 2000
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD

©fS)®V
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
652 Jefferson Cove
Sandy, Utah 84070
801-567-1157

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

KENNETH A. BILLS
DRIGGS, OSBORNE & HUANG
311 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
801-363-8370

For the Defendant:

SANDRA L. STEINVOORT
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Salt Lake City, Utah
* * *

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MONDAY, JANUARY 24, 2000; 9:16 A.M.
HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD, JUDGE PRESIDING
P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

Ready on Webb versus University,

et al.?
MS. STEINVOORT:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Okay.

Would you state your

appearances for the record, please?
MS. STEINVOORT:

Sandra Steinvoort on behalf of

the University of Utah, your Honor.
MR. BILLS: Kenneth Bills on behalf of plaintiff
James Webb, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

I have read the memoranda

that you have submitted and the affidavits.
MS. STEINVOORT:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Please go ahead.

MS. STEINVOORT:

Then I'll be a little bit more

brief probably, your Honor, if you're familiar with the
facts.

Basically, this case arises out of an accident

that occurred on — while Mr. Webb was a student at the
University of Utah.
THE COURT:

He was on a field trip, and he's on

property that doesn't belong to the University of Utah?
MS. STEINVOORT:

Correct. And the thrust of our

argument is only that the University of Utah does not owe

1

a duty Mr. Webb because there is no existence of a special
relationship.
When the Court always tells me they've read
stuff, then I get thrown off, because my argument kind of
goes —
THE COURT:
say something.

Well, nobody ever believes me when I

That's why I have to throw out some of the

facts.
MS. STEINVOORT:

Okay.

Well, I've always

believed it.
But in this particular case, your Honor, I think
there are cases, such as the Beach v. University

of

Utah,

which has facts similar to this one in the sense that
there is a student enrolled at the University of Utah on a
field trip, goes on a lamb roast with her professor and
her classmates, goes back to the campsite and is allowed
to wander off, and falls off the side of the mountain and
is a quadriplegic.
In that particular case, the Supreme Court held
that there was no special relationship, therefore no duty
owed to the student. And what's unique, in suing the
governmental agencies, is that you have to show that a
duty is owed to that particular plaintiff individually,
not at large, and you have to show that by demonstrating
that there is an ability on the behalf of the University

2

of Utah to control the conduct of a third party*

And in

this case, we feel those facts aren't alleged and that
there could not be a situation where those facts could be
alleged, because no special relationship existed.
Well, I feel like I'm curtailing myself, but
does the Court have any specific —
THE COURT: No.
MS. STEINVOORT:

-

questions that you'd like me

to go through, or...
THE COURT: Maybe you could save the rest of
your argument for your final argument.
MS. STEINVOORT:

Very well.

Thank you.

THE COURT: All right.
Mr. Bills.

Tell me where you would draw the

line, Mr. Bills, as far as the liability the university
ought to extend in your case.
MR. BILLS: Well, there is - I think you're
right.

There is a line.

line is.

I'm not sure exactly where that

The question is whether or not the duty lies

with the individuals. And again, given the procedural
background of this case, where we're at a motion to
dismiss before discovery has even commenced, they have to
show that there is no set of facts that could come out
that would bring rise to that special relationship.
In this case, under threat of his grades being

3

reduced, he's instructed to trespass onto private,
dangerous property.

If that doesn't give rise to a

special relationship between the school and the individual
who's instructed to go upon that property, I can't think
of a circumstance where the university would ever be
negligent.
Under their exception, it would swallow the
entire governmental immunity law where the state waives
governmental immunity.

Under what circumstances would it

be possible, given — with a motion to dismiss, to ever
show that a special relationship existed?

Perhaps the

only circumstances I could think of would be medical
malpractice cases with the University Hospital, but other
than -that, it would be almost impossible, at this stage of
a trial, to show no chance of there being a special
relationship between the parties.
THE COURT:

Can you even give me a hypothetical

that might exist where you believe there might be a
special relationship?
MR. BILLS:

Sure. Under the circumstances that

we believe happened in this case, where the instructor
directs the students to travel onto dangerous property.
It's different than the Beach case, where in that case —
first of all, the Beach case was a summary judgment, and
it wasn't all decided based on whether or not a special

4

duty existed.
The court looked at four specific circumstances
or theories of liability to the plaintiff.

The first was

the main one, which is their failure to supervise after
the end of the lamb roast and when the plaintiff, on her
own, wandered up onto the mountainside and got hurt.
The next was whether or not the plaintiff and
the defendant, the university, had properly instructed the
plaintiff in camping, and the court held that even if
there was a duty there that perhaps — that there was no
evidence at that point of causation.
Then they brought up an issue of the instructor
drinking and whether or not that was negligent and a
breach of the duty to that particular plaintiff. And the
court held that in that case there was no showing of
causation.
And finally — and this is the one that maybe has
the most bearing on this case — is whether or not the
university allowing underage drinking was a breach of its
special duty, and the court said that if the duty is
incapable of performance or is fundamentally at odds with
the nature of the parties' relationship, then we're loath
to find a special duty.
In this case, however, there is a special duty
when the instructor is directing and controlling the

5

students and telling them to — and specifically placing
the students in a dangerous position.

It could well turn

out, as discovery proceeds, that in fact one or more of
the defendants wasn't negligent.

In that case, then that

will be the proper time for either me to dismiss it or for
that defendant to bring a motion for summary judgment
based on the facts that actually come out in the case.
But at this stage of the game, to say the
university, as a matter of law, cannot owe a special
relationship to one of its students is premature.
THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Bills.

Ms. Steinvoort?
MS. STEINVOORT:

I can think of a situation

where a governmental agency could have a special
relationship, and those two would be the exceptions as
outlined in Section 315 of the restatement, where a party
can control the conduct of a third party.

It might be,

for example, in a prison situation where there may be
notice that someone has some hostility toward a particular
person, and you can protect and separate people.

Or when

the victim has a right to expect protection with such as
in a protective order.

If the sheriff's office is called

to respond and there's a protective order, then that
person has right to expect protection.
But in this particular case, it was — the

6

1

question really should be, could the university have

2

understood and appreciated that a student in the class

3

would slip on ice and therefore pull down Mr. Webb, and

4

those are the facts that comprise this lawsuit.

5

that the university took them to a dangerous situation.

6

It's the fact that one student slipped and pulled down her

7

classmate.

8
9

It isn't

And in that situation, I don't think the
university could assess and appreciate the potential

10

threat of harm to Mr. Webb, and I also don't believe that

11

the university could do anything to protect against it

12

without circumscribing its own conduct, which is to — in a

13

geology class, it takes students on a field trip.

14

sort of an anticipated activity, to go and investigate,

15

and it would change dramatically the way the teacher could

16

teach that particular class.

It's

17

So on that, your Honor, we would submit it.

18

THE COURT:

19

The motion is granted.

20

Thank you,
The University of Utah

is dismissed.

21

MS. STEINVOORT:

22 I

(Proceedings concluded at 9:24 a.m.)

23
24
25

Thank you, your Honor,
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Kenneth A. Bills. The defendant was represented by Sandra L. Steinvoort, Assistant Attorney
General.

The Court having heard argument of counsel, having reviewed the memoranda submitted
by counsel and being fully advised on the matter, now and therefore, hereby ORDER,
ADJUDGE AND DECREE as follows:
1.

That the motion to dismiss is granted and the plaintiffs claims against the

defendant University of Utah are dismissed with prejudice.
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reason." Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863
P.2d 59 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Award of attorney fees to landowners against
adjacent landowners, on the basis that the
adjacent landowners acted in bad faith by seeking attorney fees from landowners after obtaining a quitclaim deed from landowner for the
disputed property, could not be supported under either § 78-27-56(1) or this rule, because
when adjacent landowners filed their claim
there was there was no clear prohibition on the
recovery of attorney fees in undisputed quiet
title actions and finding was not made as to bad
faith on part of the adjacent landowner.
Chipman v. Miller, 934 R2d 1158 (Utah Ct. App.
1997).
—Standard
Sanctions were improper against an attorney, where opposing parties conceded that no
particular document was signed in violation of
the rule, but simply argued that even if the
attorney believed the case was well grounded
when he filed the complaint, he should have
known after he met with counsel for defendants
that the case could not go forward. Jeschke v.
Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Rule 12

Utah appellate courts should use the threestandard approach in reviewing a trial court's
Rule 11 findings. This approach includes: (1)
reviewing the trial court's findings of fact under
the clearly erroneous standard; (2) reviewing
the trial court's ultimate conclusion that Rule
11 was violated and any subsidiary legal conclusions under the correction of error standard;
and (3) reviewing the trial court's determination as to the type and amount of sanction to be
imposed under the abuse of discretion standard. Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah
1992); Giffen v. R.W.L., 913 P.2d 761 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996).
The determination of whether conduct violates Rule 11 is made on an objective basis.
Giffen v. R.W.L., 913 R2d 761 (Utah Ct. App.
1996).
Cited in Walker v. Carlson, 740 R2d 1372
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d
1201 (Utah Ct. App. 199U; Rimensburger v.
Rimensburger, 841 P2d 709 (Utah Ct. App.
1992); Crowther v. Mower, 876 P.2d 876 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994); Astili v. Clark, 956 P2d 1081
(Utah Ct. App. 1998).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah L a w R e v i e w . — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments —
Attorney's Fees, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 342.
Brigham Young L a w Review. — Curbing
Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough Is
Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 579.
Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation:
We're Not There Yet, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 597.
Note, Appellate Review of Rule 11 Issues —
De Novo or Abuse of Discretion? Thomas v.
Capital Security Services, Inc., 1989 B.Y.U. L.
Rev. 877.
Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics,
1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 959.
Fines Under New Federal Civil Rule 11: The
New Monetary Sanctions for the "Stop-andThink-Again" Rule, 1993 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 879.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading
§§ 339 to 349.
C.J.S, — 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 339 to 366.
A.L.R. — Liability of attorney, acting for
client, for malicious prosecution, 46 A.L.R.4th
249.
Inherent power of federal district court to
impose monetary sanctions on counsel in absence of contempt of court, 77 A.L.R. Fed. 789.
Comment Note — General principles regarding imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-

eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 A.L.R. Fed.
107.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions
for defamation, 95 A.L.R. Fed. 181.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in action
for wrongful discharge from employment, 96
A.L.R. Fed. 13.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions
for securities fraud, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 107.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions
for infliction of emotional distress, 98 A.L.R.
Fed. 442.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in antitrust actions, 99 A.L.R. Fed. 573.
Procedural requirements for imposition of
sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 100 A.L.R. Fed. 556.

Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty days
after the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless otherwise
expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto
.Within twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his
j^Ply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service

Rule 12
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of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under
this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed
by order of the court:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial
on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after
notice of the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive
pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the more definite
statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the
person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
(7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses
or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to
which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, he may
assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a
motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56,
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on
the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall
be treated as one for summ ary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders
that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably
be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a more definite
statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The motion shall point
out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted
and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the order
or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the
pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading upon him,
the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule
may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available to
him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all
defenses and objections then available to him which this rule permits to be
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raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this
rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which he
does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made
no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an
indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after
the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a
waiver of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination
by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff.
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the
United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 12, F.R.C.P.

Cross References. — Motions generally.
U.R.CJP. 7.
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